数学与金融经典教材（影印版）·激励理论：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] epub pdf mobi txt 电子书 下载 2024

数学与金融经典教材（影印版）·激励理论：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] epub pdf mobi txt 电子书 下载 2024

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数学与金融经典教材（影印版）·激励理论：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] epub pdf mobi txt 电子书 下载 2024

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内容简介

　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.

内页插图

目录

Foreword
Introduction
1 Incentives in Economic'Thought
1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture
1.2 Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management
1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Croves: The Free-Rider Problem
1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting
1.5 L60n Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies
1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance
1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives
1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination
1.9 Incentives in Plaiined Economies
1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design
1.11 Auctions

2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.1 The Basic Model
2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract
2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts
2.4 Information Rents
2.5 The Optunization Program of the PrincipaJ
2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information
2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing
2.9 The Revelation Principle
2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent
2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints
2.12 Commitment
2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms
2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting
2.15 Contract Theory at Work
Appendix

3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection
3.1 More than Two Types
3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information
3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and
Countervailing Incentives
3.4 Random Participation Constraint
3.5 Limited Liability
3.6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification
3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off
Appendices

4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs
4.1 The Model
4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation
……
5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard
6 Nonverifiability
7 Mixed Models
8 Dynamics under Full Commitment
9 Limits and Extensions

Re ferences
Author Index
Subject Index

前言/序言

　　The development of the theory of incentives has been a major advance iii eco- nomics in the last thirty years. The objective of this book is to provide easy access to this theory for undergraduate and first-year graduate smdents in economics. Our goal is not to be as complete as possible in covering and surveying the many contributions that have fiourished in the realm of incentive theory. Instead， our contribution is methodological and intended to offer students some iiiitial clues for analyzing the issues raised by this theory. As much as possible we have favored the simplest models to explain the core of the theory. The exposition has been divided into three books for methodological clarity. This volume presents the basic principal-agent theory with complete contracts. It allows a first exposition of the transaction costs created by contracting under asymmetric information without having to appeal to sophisticated game theory concepts.
　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.
　　Going through the text and.checking the proofs should provide a good way for stu-dents to appropriate the material. Throughout the book we have listed under the heading the major references that are useful to pursue the study of incentive theory.
　　……

数学与金融经典教材（影印版）·激励理论：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] epub pdf mobi txt 电子书 下载 2024

数学与金融经典教材（影印版）·激励理论：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] 下载 epub mobi pdf txt 电子书 2024

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信息经济学经典

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拉丰教授1947年生于法国图卢兹,1973年秋,在他获得应用数学博士学位后不久就直接奔赴哈佛,拜在经济学大师肯尼思·阿罗的门下.他仅用一年半的时间就获得了哈佛大学经济学博士学位（1975年）,并在公共经济学和机制设计领域作出了重要贡献.1979年,拉丰教授的专著《公共决策中的激励》（与格林合著）出版,确立了他在公共经济学领域的学术地位.自20世纪80年代初起,拉丰教授开始探索将信息经济学与激励理论的基本思想和方法应用于垄断行业的规制理论的道路.在批判传统规制理论的基础上,他和梯若尔（Tirole）创建了一个激励性规制的一般框架,并以1993年出版的著作《政府采购与规制中的激励理论》完成了新规制经济学理论框架的构建,从而奠定了他们在这一领域的学术领导者地位.

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拉丰教授是一个极其勤奋，因而高产的学者,迄今为止已经出版了12本专著和300多篇高水平的学术论文.他的学术贡献为他在经济学界赢得了极高的声誉.同时,作为一个著名的经济学教育家,他为法国经济学的振兴作出了巨大的贡献.

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最具代表性的弗洛姆（V. H. Vroom）的“期望理论”认为，一个目标对人的激励程度受两个因素影响：

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经典教材，需要慢慢啃

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从90年代初起,拉丰教授开始关注组织中的激励问题,他深刻认识到了组织中的串谋行为对激励机制造成的扭曲是导致经济组织效率低下的一个最为根本的原因,因此在设计一个经济组织的激励机制时,必须考虑防范串谋的激励机制.a拉丰教授在这一领域作出了开创性的贡献,并将这些理论贡献集成在《激励与政治经济学》（1999年）一书中.

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