数学与金融经典教材(影印版)·激励理论:委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model]

数学与金融经典教材(影印版)·激励理论:委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] pdf epub mobi txt 电子书 下载 2025

[美] 拉奉特(Laffont J.J.) 著
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出版社: 世界图书出版公司
ISBN:9787510050503
版次:1
商品编码:11154485
包装:平装
外文名称:The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model
开本:16开
出版时间:2013-01-01
用纸:胶版纸
页数:421
正文语种:英文

具体描述

内容简介

  The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.

内页插图

目录

Foreword
Introduction
1 Incentives in Economic'Thought
1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture
1.2 Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management
1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Croves: The Free-Rider Problem
1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting
1.5 L60n Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies
1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance
1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives
1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination
1.9 Incentives in Plaiined Economies
1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design
1.11 Auctions

2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.1 The Basic Model
2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract
2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts
2.4 Information Rents
2.5 The Optunization Program of the PrincipaJ
2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information
2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing
2.9 The Revelation Principle
2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent
2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints
2.12 Commitment
2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms
2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting
2.15 Contract Theory at Work
Appendix

3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection
3.1 More than Two Types
3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information
3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and
Countervailing Incentives
3.4 Random Participation Constraint
3.5 Limited Liability
3.6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification
3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off
Appendices

4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs
4.1 The Model
4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation
……
5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard
6 Nonverifiability
7 Mixed Models
8 Dynamics under Full Commitment
9 Limits and Extensions

Re ferences
Author Index
Subject Index

前言/序言

  The development of the theory of incentives has been a major advance iii eco- nomics in the last thirty years. The objective of this book is to provide easy access to this theory for undergraduate and first-year graduate smdents in economics. Our goal is not to be as complete as possible in covering and surveying the many contributions that have fiourished in the realm of incentive theory. Instead, our contribution is methodological and intended to offer students some iiiitial clues for analyzing the issues raised by this theory. As much as possible we have favored the simplest models to explain the core of the theory. The exposition has been divided into three books for methodological clarity. This volume presents the basic principal-agent theory with complete contracts. It allows a first exposition of the transaction costs created by contracting under asymmetric information without having to appeal to sophisticated game theory concepts.
  The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.
  Going through the text and.checking the proofs should provide a good way for stu-dents to appropriate the material. Throughout the book we have listed under the heading the major references that are useful to pursue the study of incentive theory.
  ……

用户评价

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委托代理理论是制度经济学契约理论的主要内容之一,主要研究的委托代理关系是指一个或多个行为主体根据一种明示或隐含的契约,指定、雇佣另一些行为主体为其服务,同时授予后者一定的决策权利,并根据后者提供的服务数量和质量对其支付相应的报酬。授权者就是委托人,被授权者就是代理人。

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本书为京东图书活动时购入,价格方面很是给力。下面谈下这本书涉及的内容。

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期望值

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读了这本书之后,数学与金融经典教材(影印版)·激励理论委托代理模型,超值。买书就来来京东商城。价格还比别家便宜,还免邮费不错,速度还真是快而且都是正版书。,买回来觉得还是非常值的。我喜欢看书,喜欢看各种各样的书,看的很杂,文学名著,流行小说都看,只要作者的文笔不是太差,总能让我从头到脚看完整本书。只不过很多时候是当成故事来看,看完了感叹一番也就丢下了。所在来这里买书是非常明智的。然而,目前社会上还有许多人被一些价值不大的东西所束缚,却自得其乐,还觉得很满足。经过几百年的探索和发展,人们对物质需求已不再迫切,但对于精神自由的需求却无端被抹杀了。总之,我认为现代人最缺乏的就是一种开阔进取,寻找最大自由的精神。中国人讲虚实相生,天人合一的思想,于空寂处见流行,于流行处见空寂,从而获得对于道的体悟,唯道集虚。这在传统的艺术中得到了充分的体现,因此中国古代的绘画,提倡留白、布白,用空白来表现丰富多彩的想象空间和广博深广的人生意味,体现了包纳万物、吞吐一切的胸襟和情怀。让我得到了一种生活情趣和审美方式,伴着笔墨的清香,细细体味,那自由孤寂的灵魂,高尚清真的人格魅力,在寻求美的道路上指引着我,让我抛弃浮躁的世俗,向美学丛林的深处迈进。合上书,闭上眼,书的余香犹存,而我脑海里浮现的,是一个皎皎明月,仙仙白云,鸿雁高翔,缀叶如雨的冲淡清幽境界。愿我们身边多一些主教般光明的使者,有更多人能加入到助人为乐、见义勇为的队伍中来。社会需要这样的人,世界需要这样的人,只有这样我们才能创造我们的生活,..-...-.我曾经属于后一类。那时,我处于极度危险的境地。看薛老师这些话,你能觉得这是一个真实的老师,她说的话就象是邻居唠家常那样真诚自然。对于书中她大胆、直率的言辞,我很钦佩,不是每个人都有这种胆识、思维的。她能把一件看似简单惯常的事情剖析提头头是道,透过了表象看到了它的内在根源。她有勇气把一些不同与大家都说的话写在纸上,让别人看,虽然多数人心理或许也如她所想。但凭这一点儿,就让人佩服至极。比如,她对老师象蜡烛、春蚕,没有教不好的学生,只有教不好的老师这些话的评析,一针见血,道出了我们老师的共同心声。之所以造就了她感说真话,敢于抵制一切不利于学生成长和进步的制度。因为薛老师的人生信念就是缺乏真诚、理性和趣味的日子是不值得过的。教育教学中有了平衡愉悦的心态,正确的定位和良好的策略,才能在饱满热情中,在正确策略中扶植学生向上。薛老师在自序中写道,我是特意捕捉了清风、乐声和野芳,录在这里,专门用于鼓励自己,就算是不定期地给自己献一小朵小花吧——真诚美丽的文字,正是心灵开出的花朵。又一次阐述了她的

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激励理论中的过程学派认为,通过满足人的需要实现组织的目标有一个过程,即需要通过制订一定的目标影响人们的需要,从而激发人的行动,包括弗洛姆的期望理论、洛克和休斯的目标设置理论、波特和劳勒的综合激励模式、亚当斯的公平理论、斯金纳的强化理论等等。

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别人推荐给我买的,不错!!

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经典教材,需要慢慢啃

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书写的不错,内容很全面

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