数学与金融经典教材（影印版）·激励理论：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] epub pdf mobi txt 电子书 下载 2024

数学与金融经典教材（影印版）·激励理论：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] epub pdf mobi txt 电子书 下载 2024

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数学与金融经典教材（影印版）·激励理论：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] epub pdf mobi txt 电子书 下载 2024

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内容简介

　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.

内页插图

目录

Foreword
Introduction
1 Incentives in Economic'Thought
1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture
1.2 Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management
1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Croves: The Free-Rider Problem
1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting
1.5 L60n Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies
1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance
1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives
1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination
1.9 Incentives in Plaiined Economies
1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design
1.11 Auctions

2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.1 The Basic Model
2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract
2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts
2.4 Information Rents
2.5 The Optunization Program of the PrincipaJ
2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information
2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing
2.9 The Revelation Principle
2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent
2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints
2.12 Commitment
2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms
2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting
2.15 Contract Theory at Work
Appendix

3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection
3.1 More than Two Types
3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information
3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and
Countervailing Incentives
3.4 Random Participation Constraint
3.5 Limited Liability
3.6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification
3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off
Appendices

4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs
4.1 The Model
4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation
……
5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard
6 Nonverifiability
7 Mixed Models
8 Dynamics under Full Commitment
9 Limits and Extensions

Re ferences
Author Index
Subject Index

前言/序言

　　The development of the theory of incentives has been a major advance iii eco- nomics in the last thirty years. The objective of this book is to provide easy access to this theory for undergraduate and first-year graduate smdents in economics. Our goal is not to be as complete as possible in covering and surveying the many contributions that have fiourished in the realm of incentive theory. Instead， our contribution is methodological and intended to offer students some iiiitial clues for analyzing the issues raised by this theory. As much as possible we have favored the simplest models to explain the core of the theory. The exposition has been divided into three books for methodological clarity. This volume presents the basic principal-agent theory with complete contracts. It allows a first exposition of the transaction costs created by contracting under asymmetric information without having to appeal to sophisticated game theory concepts.
　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.
　　Going through the text and.checking the proofs should provide a good way for stu-dents to appropriate the material. Throughout the book we have listed under the heading the major references that are useful to pursue the study of incentive theory.
　　……

数学与金融经典教材（影印版）·激励理论：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] epub pdf mobi txt 电子书 下载 2024

数学与金融经典教材（影印版）·激励理论：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] 下载 epub mobi pdf txt 电子书 2024

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编辑本段期望理论

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编辑本段定义

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都是英文，看不懂啊

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本书为京东图书活动时购入，价格方面很是给力。下面谈下这本书涉及的内容。

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委托代理理论是建立在非对称信息博弈论的基础上的。非对称信息(asymmetric information)指的是某些参与人拥有但另一些参与人不拥有的信息。信息的非对称性可从以下两个角度进行划分:一是非对称发生的时间，二是非对称信息的内容。从非对称发生的时间看，非对称性可能发生在当事人签约之前(ex ante)，也可能发生在签约之后(ex post)，分别称为事前非对称和事后非对称。研究事前非对称信息博弈的模型称为逆向选择模型(adverse selection)，研究事后非对称信息的模型称为道德风险模型(moral hazard)。从非对称信息的内容看，非对称信息可能是指某些参与人的行为(action)，研究此类问题的，我们称为隐藏行为模型(hidden action);也可能是指某些参与人隐藏的知识(knowledge)，研究此类问题的模型我们称之为隐藏知识模型(hidden knowledge)。

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书面委托代理的授权委托书应当载明代理人的姓名或者名称、代理事项、权限和期间，并由委托人签名或者盖章。

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内容简介近四十年来经济学最重要的发展在于激励领域，它研究了不对称信息下当事人如何获得的潜在的互利收益的激励问题。现在是将这一领域集成并系统化的时候了。让-雅克•拉丰是这一领域最重要的贡献者之一，而大卫•马赫蒂摩也显示了他的理论功底。本书从这一领域最基本的模型出发，完整而清晰地概括了这一领域的发展历程。 目录序 导言 第一章 经济思想中的激励问题 第二章 租金抽取与配置效率的权衡 第三章 逆向选择的激励与参与约束 第四章 道德风险：基本的权衡 第五章 道德风险下的激励和参与约束 第六章 不可验证性 第七章 混合模型 第八章 完全承诺下的动态模型 第九章 局限性与扩展

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