數學與金融經典教材（影印版）·激勵理論：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] epub pdf mobi txt 電子書 下載 2025

數學與金融經典教材（影印版）·激勵理論：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] epub pdf mobi txt 電子書 下載 2025

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數學與金融經典教材（影印版）·激勵理論：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] epub pdf mobi txt 電子書 下載 2025

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內容簡介

　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.

內頁插圖

目錄

Foreword
Introduction
1 Incentives in Economic'Thought
1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture
1.2 Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management
1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Croves: The Free-Rider Problem
1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting
1.5 L60n Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies
1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance
1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives
1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination
1.9 Incentives in Plaiined Economies
1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design
1.11 Auctions

2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.1 The Basic Model
2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract
2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts
2.4 Information Rents
2.5 The Optunization Program of the PrincipaJ
2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information
2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing
2.9 The Revelation Principle
2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent
2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints
2.12 Commitment
2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms
2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting
2.15 Contract Theory at Work
Appendix

3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection
3.1 More than Two Types
3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information
3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and
Countervailing Incentives
3.4 Random Participation Constraint
3.5 Limited Liability
3.6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification
3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off
Appendices

4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs
4.1 The Model
4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation
……
5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard
6 Nonverifiability
7 Mixed Models
8 Dynamics under Full Commitment
9 Limits and Extensions

Re ferences
Author Index
Subject Index

前言/序言

　　The development of the theory of incentives has been a major advance iii eco- nomics in the last thirty years. The objective of this book is to provide easy access to this theory for undergraduate and first-year graduate smdents in economics. Our goal is not to be as complete as possible in covering and surveying the many contributions that have fiourished in the realm of incentive theory. Instead， our contribution is methodological and intended to offer students some iiiitial clues for analyzing the issues raised by this theory. As much as possible we have favored the simplest models to explain the core of the theory. The exposition has been divided into three books for methodological clarity. This volume presents the basic principal-agent theory with complete contracts. It allows a first exposition of the transaction costs created by contracting under asymmetric information without having to appeal to sophisticated game theory concepts.
　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.
　　Going through the text and.checking the proofs should provide a good way for stu-dents to appropriate the material. Throughout the book we have listed under the heading the major references that are useful to pursue the study of incentive theory.
　　……

數學與金融經典教材（影印版）·激勵理論：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] epub pdf mobi txt 電子書 下載 2025

數學與金融經典教材（影印版）·激勵理論：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] 下載 epub mobi pdf txt 電子書

評分☆☆☆☆☆

期望值

評分☆☆☆☆☆

內容簡介近四十年來經濟學最重要的發展在於激勵領域，它研究瞭不對稱信息下當事人如何獲得的潛在的互利收益的激勵問題。現在是將這一領域集成並係統化的時候瞭。讓-雅剋•拉豐是這一領域最重要的貢獻者之一，而大衛•馬赫蒂摩也顯示瞭他的理論功底。本書從這一領域最基本的模型齣發，完整而清晰地概括瞭這一領域的發展曆程。 目錄序 導言 第一章 經濟思想中的激勵問題 第二章 租金抽取與配置效率的權衡 第三章 逆嚮選擇的激勵與參與約束 第四章 道德風險：基本的權衡 第五章 道德風險下的激勵和參與約束 第六章 不可驗證性 第七章 混閤模型 第八章 完全承諾下的動態模型 第九章 局限性與擴展

評分☆☆☆☆☆

書寫的不錯，內容很全麵

評分☆☆☆☆☆

民事法律行為的委托代理，可以用書麵形式，也可以用口頭形式。法律規定用書麵形式的，應當用書麵形式。[1]

評分☆☆☆☆☆

委托代理理論的主要觀點認為：委托代理關係是隨著生産力大發展和規模化大生産的齣現而産生的。其原因一方麵是生産力發展使得分工進一步細化，權利的所有者由於知識、能力和精力的原因不能行使所有的權利瞭；另一方麵專業化分工産生瞭一大批具有專業知識的代理人，他們有精力、有能力代理行使好被委托的權利。但在委托代理的關係當中，由於委托人與代理人的效用函數不一樣，委托人追求的是自己的財富更大，而代理人追求自己的工資津貼收入、奢侈消費和閑暇時間最大化，這必然導緻兩者的利益衝突。在沒有有效的製度安排下代理人的行為很可能最終損害委托人的利益。而世界——不管是經濟領域還是社會領域——都普遍存在委托代理關係。

評分☆☆☆☆☆

激勵理論中的過程學派認為，通過滿足人的需要實現組織的目標有一個過程，即需要通過製訂一定的目標影響人們的需要，從而激發人的行動，包括弗洛姆的期望理論、洛剋和休斯的目標設置理論、波特和勞勒的綜閤激勵模式、亞當斯的公平理論、斯金納的強化理論等等。

評分☆☆☆☆☆

去世瞭這麼多年，這本書依舊是經典

評分☆☆☆☆☆

管理心理學把激勵看成是“持續激發動機的心理過程”。激勵水平越高，完成目標的努力程度和滿意度也越強，工作效能就越高；反之，激勵水平越低，則缺乏完成組織目標的動機，工作效率也越低[2]。

評分☆☆☆☆☆

期望值

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