數學與金融經典教材（影印版）·激勵理論：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] epub pdf mobi txt 電子書 下載 2024

數學與金融經典教材（影印版）·激勵理論：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] epub pdf mobi txt 電子書 下載 2024

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數學與金融經典教材（影印版）·激勵理論：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] epub pdf mobi txt 電子書 下載 2024

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內容簡介

　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.

內頁插圖

目錄

Foreword
Introduction
1 Incentives in Economic'Thought
1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture
1.2 Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management
1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Croves: The Free-Rider Problem
1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting
1.5 L60n Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies
1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance
1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives
1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination
1.9 Incentives in Plaiined Economies
1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design
1.11 Auctions

2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.1 The Basic Model
2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract
2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts
2.4 Information Rents
2.5 The Optunization Program of the PrincipaJ
2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information
2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing
2.9 The Revelation Principle
2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent
2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints
2.12 Commitment
2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms
2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting
2.15 Contract Theory at Work
Appendix

3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection
3.1 More than Two Types
3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information
3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and
Countervailing Incentives
3.4 Random Participation Constraint
3.5 Limited Liability
3.6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification
3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off
Appendices

4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs
4.1 The Model
4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation
……
5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard
6 Nonverifiability
7 Mixed Models
8 Dynamics under Full Commitment
9 Limits and Extensions

Re ferences
Author Index
Subject Index

前言/序言

　　The development of the theory of incentives has been a major advance iii eco- nomics in the last thirty years. The objective of this book is to provide easy access to this theory for undergraduate and first-year graduate smdents in economics. Our goal is not to be as complete as possible in covering and surveying the many contributions that have fiourished in the realm of incentive theory. Instead， our contribution is methodological and intended to offer students some iiiitial clues for analyzing the issues raised by this theory. As much as possible we have favored the simplest models to explain the core of the theory. The exposition has been divided into three books for methodological clarity. This volume presents the basic principal-agent theory with complete contracts. It allows a first exposition of the transaction costs created by contracting under asymmetric information without having to appeal to sophisticated game theory concepts.
　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.
　　Going through the text and.checking the proofs should provide a good way for stu-dents to appropriate the material. Throughout the book we have listed under the heading the major references that are useful to pursue the study of incentive theory.
　　……

數學與金融經典教材（影印版）·激勵理論：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] epub pdf mobi txt 電子書 下載 2024

數學與金融經典教材（影印版）·激勵理論：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] 下載 epub mobi pdf txt 電子書

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拉豐教授1947年生於法國圖盧茲,1973年鞦,在他獲得應用數學博士學位後不久就直接奔赴哈佛,拜在經濟學大師肯尼思·阿羅的門下.他僅用一年半的時間就獲得瞭哈佛大學經濟學博士學位（1975年）,並在公共經濟學和機製設計領域作齣瞭重要貢獻.1979年,拉豐教授的專著《公共決策中的激勵》（與格林閤著）齣版,確立瞭他在公共經濟學領域的學術地位.自20世紀80年代初起,拉豐教授開始探索將信息經濟學與激勵理論的基本思想和方法應用於壟斷行業的規製理論的道路.在批判傳統規製理論的基礎上,他和梯若爾（Tirole）創建瞭一個激勵性規製的一般框架,並以1993年齣版的著作《政府采購與規製中的激勵理論》完成瞭新規製經濟學理論框架的構建,從而奠定瞭他們在這一領域的學術領導者地位.

評分☆☆☆☆☆

指人對實現該目標有多大價值的主觀判斷。如果實現該目標對人來說，很有價值，人的積極性就高；反之，積極性則低。

評分☆☆☆☆☆

委托代理關係起源於“專業化”的存在。當存在“專業化”時就可能齣現一種關係，在這種關係中，代理人由於相對優勢而代錶委托人行動。現代意義的委托代理的概念最早是由羅斯提齣的:“如果當事人雙方，其中代理人一方代錶委托人一方的利益行使某些決策權，則代理關係就隨之産生。”委托代理理論從不同於傳統微觀經濟學的角度來分析企業內部、企業之間的委托代理關係，它在解釋一些組織現象時，優於一般的微觀經濟學。

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77411255563384669855

評分☆☆☆☆☆

77411255563384669855

評分☆☆☆☆☆

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激勵是指組織通過設計適當的外部奬酬形式和工作環境，以一定的行為規範和懲罰性措施，藉助信息溝通來激發、引導、保持和歸化組織成員的行為，以有效地實現組織及其成員個人目標的係統性活動，被認為是“最偉大的管理原理”。

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