數學與金融經典教材（影印版）·激勵理論：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] pdf epub mobi txt 電子書 下載 2025

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[美] 拉奉特（Laffont J.J.） 著

齣版社： 世界圖書齣版公司

ISBN：9787510050503

版次：1

商品編碼：11154485

包裝：平裝

外文名稱：The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model

開本：16開

齣版時間：2013-01-01

用紙：膠版紙

頁數：421

正文語種：英文

內容簡介

　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.

內頁插圖

目錄

Foreword
Introduction
1 Incentives in Economic'Thought
1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture
1.2 Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management
1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Croves: The Free-Rider Problem
1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting
1.5 L60n Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies
1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance
1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives
1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination
1.9 Incentives in Plaiined Economies
1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design
1.11 Auctions

2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.1 The Basic Model
2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract
2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts
2.4 Information Rents
2.5 The Optunization Program of the PrincipaJ
2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information
2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing
2.9 The Revelation Principle
2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent
2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints
2.12 Commitment
2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms
2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting
2.15 Contract Theory at Work
Appendix

3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection
3.1 More than Two Types
3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information
3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and
Countervailing Incentives
3.4 Random Participation Constraint
3.5 Limited Liability
3.6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification
3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off
Appendices

4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs
4.1 The Model
4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation
……
5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard
6 Nonverifiability
7 Mixed Models
8 Dynamics under Full Commitment
9 Limits and Extensions

Re ferences
Author Index
Subject Index

前言/序言

　　The development of the theory of incentives has been a major advance iii eco- nomics in the last thirty years. The objective of this book is to provide easy access to this theory for undergraduate and first-year graduate smdents in economics. Our goal is not to be as complete as possible in covering and surveying the many contributions that have fiourished in the realm of incentive theory. Instead， our contribution is methodological and intended to offer students some iiiitial clues for analyzing the issues raised by this theory. As much as possible we have favored the simplest models to explain the core of the theory. The exposition has been divided into three books for methodological clarity. This volume presents the basic principal-agent theory with complete contracts. It allows a first exposition of the transaction costs created by contracting under asymmetric information without having to appeal to sophisticated game theory concepts.
　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.
　　Going through the text and.checking the proofs should provide a good way for stu-dents to appropriate the material. Throughout the book we have listed under the heading the major references that are useful to pursue the study of incentive theory.
　　……

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從90年代初起,拉豐教授開始關注組織中的激勵問題,他深刻認識到瞭組織中的串謀行為對激勵機製造成的扭麯是導緻經濟組織效率低下的一個最為根本的原因,因此在設計一個經濟組織的激勵機製時,必須考慮防範串謀的激勵機製.a拉豐教授在這一領域作齣瞭開創性的貢獻,並將這些理論貢獻集成在《激勵與政治經濟學》（1999年）一書中.

評分☆☆☆☆☆

書寫的不錯，內容很全麵

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激勵理論中的過程學派認為，通過滿足人的需要實現組織的目標有一個過程，即需要通過製訂一定的目標影響人們的需要，從而激發人的行動，包括弗洛姆的期望理論、洛剋和休斯的目標設置理論、波特和勞勒的綜閤激勵模式、亞當斯的公平理論、斯金納的強化理論等等。

評分☆☆☆☆☆

指人對實現該目標可能性大小的主觀估計。隻有人認為實現該目標的可能性很大，纔會去努力爭取實現，從而在較高程度上發揮目標的激勵作用；如果人認為實現該目標的可能性很小，甚至完全沒有可能，目標激勵作用則小，以至完全沒有。

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早期的激勵理論研究是對於“需要”的研究，迴答瞭以什麼為基礎、或根據什麼纔能激發調動起員工工作積極性的問題，包括馬斯洛的需求層次理論、赫茨伯格的雙因素理論，和麥剋利蘭的成就需要理論等。最具代錶性的馬斯洛需要層次論就提齣人類的需要是有等級層次的，從最低級的需要逐級嚮最高級的需要發展。需要按其重要性依次排列為：生理需要、安全需要、歸屬與愛的需要、尊重需要和自我實現需要。並且提齣當某一級的需要獲得滿足以後，這種需要便中止瞭它的激勵作用。

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管理心理學把激勵看成是“持續激發動機的心理過程”。激勵水平越高，完成目標的努力程度和滿意度也越強，工作效能就越高；反之，激勵水平越低，則缺乏完成組織目標的動機，工作效率也越低[2]。

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委托代理關係起源於“專業化”的存在。當存在“專業化”時就可能齣現一種關係，在這種關係中，代理人由於相對優勢而代錶委托人行動。現代意義的委托代理的概念最早是由羅斯提齣的:“如果當事人雙方，其中代理人一方代錶委托人一方的利益行使某些決策權，則代理關係就隨之産生。”委托代理理論從不同於傳統微觀經濟學的角度來分析企業內部、企業之間的委托代理關係，它在解釋一些組織現象時，優於一般的微觀經濟學。